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HARALD J. VAN HEERDE, ELS GIJSBRECHTS, and KOEN PAUWELS* 
Although retail price wars have received much business press and 
some research attention, it is unclear how they affect consumer purchase 
behavior. This article studies an unprecedented price war in Dutch 
grocery retailing that started in fall 2003, initiated by the market leader to 
halt its sliding market share. The authors investigate the short- and long 
term effects of the price war on store visits, on spending, and on the 
sensitivity of these decisions to weekly prices and price image. They use 
a unique data set with consumer hand-scan and perceptual data for a 
national panel of 1821 households, covering two years before and two 
years after the price war started. Although the price war initially entailed 
more shopping around and increased spending, spending per visit 
ultimately dropped because consumers redistributed their purchases 
across stores. The price war made consumers more sensitive to weekly 
prices and price image, which helped both the chain that showed an 
improvement in price image (the price war initiator) and the chains that 
already had a favorable price image (hard discounters). The price war 
initiator managed to halt the slide in its market share, and its stock price 
improved. The losers were the rival mid-level and high-end chains. Unlike 
the initiator, their price image did not improve, and they suffered from 
increased price image sensitivity. The authors provide managerial 
implications for firms that are (or about to be) involved in a price war. 
Keywords: price war, multivariate Tobit II model, store visits, spending, 
price image 
Winners and Losers in a Major Price War 
In the early 2000s, the leading Dutch supermarket chain 
Albert Heijn suffered from an unfavorable and deteriorating 
price image, which was especially troublesome in light of 
the rise of hard discounters (Aldi and Lidl) and worsening 
economic conditions. Despite their continued belief in the 
retailer's quality and service, fewer and fewer shoppers 
could justify paying such high prices. After several years of 
a sliding market share, on October 20, 2003, Albert Heijn 
decided to slash its prices for more than 1000 products. 
Using the headline "From now on, your daily groceries are 
much less expensive," its double-page color advertisements 
in all national and local newspapers made clear that the 
chain was committed to decrease its prices systematically 
and permanently.1 
A price battle between large retailers is not uncommon. 
But the price war that rages now is entirely different. 
The price cuts encompass a much larger assortment, 
and the percentage price reductions are spectacular. 
More is going on here. (Sch?ndorff 2003, p. 1) 
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additional factors may have contributed to Albert Heijn's decision to 
initiate a major policy change. Its holding company, Ahold, was involved 
in a major accounting scandal in 2002, which seriously affected its reputa 
tion as a reliable firm. Furthermore, in the weeks preceding the price war, 
the media and the general public had been stirred up by a payment bonus 
for Albert Heijn's chief executive officer, which many considered exces 
sive in a time of economic decline. Several customers even decided to par 
ticipate in a boycott of Albert Heijn to express their disagreement. 
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Figure 1 
PRICES OF A 1.5-LITER BOTTLE OF COCA-COLA AT FOUR LEADING CHAINS OVER TIME 
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The price reduction applied to many national brands 
from a wide variety of categories. For example, Figure 1 
shows how the regular price for a 1.5-liter bottle of Coca 
Cola went down from 1.23 to 1.12 (-9%). Although 
Albert Heijn's operation to decrease prices was undertaken 
in complete secrecy, within two days all major competitors 
carrying this (Coca-Cola) stockkeeping unit (SKU) (C1000, 
Edah, and Super de Boer) matched or even exceeded the 
price reductions. 
A week later, Albert Heijn decreased prices for another 
550 products. The price war that followed is unprecedented 
in Dutch retailing. As Table 1 shows, many more price 
cutting rounds occurred over the next years and lasted until 
October 31, 2005. These subsequent rounds involved differ 
ent brands (national versus private label) and categories, 
resulting in negative retail margins for hundreds of products 
(Holla and Koreman 2006; Van Aalst et al. 2005). As for 
scope and depth, this national price war dwarfs both docu 
mented incidents in the grocery industry that Heil and 
Helsen (2001) mention: the price cuts on private labels 
among the U.K. retailers Tesco and Asda and the 2% price 
drop in the Houston retailing market. In our case, the price 
war was nationwide, entailing an 8.2% reduction in food 
prices (Baltesen 2006a) and resulting in the lowest inflation 
level in 15 years (Consumer Reports 2004). The loss in 
added value for the Dutch retailing industry is estimated to 
be 900 million in one year, and more than 30,000 employ 
ees in the grocery industry lost their jobs (Van Aalst et al. 
2005). 
This Dutch supermarket price war fits in with the trend 
that retail price competition has become increasingly vivid 
in recent years, reducing retailer profitability (Ailawadi 
2001). Discounters such as Wal-Mart, Aldi, and Lidl are 
challenging traditional retail formats on both sides of the 
Atlantic (BusinessWeek 2003). In almost all Western mar 
kets, grocery discounters have captured market share from 
traditional supermarkets and now occupy a prominent posi 
tion (Cleeren et al. 2007). In the United States, Wal-Mart 
controls a large part of the retail market and is driving down 
prices at other retailers (Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg 
2006). In the Netherlands, more than 52% of households 
frequently shopped at hard discounters Aldi or Lidl in fall 
2003, up from 30% in 2001 (GfK 2003). The reaction of 
traditional retailers has varied from focusing on quality and 
service to engaging the challengers with substantial price 
reductions (Rogers 2001). However, these price reductions 
may trigger price wars, as in the case of Dutch supermar 
kets, which can last for a long time and strongly affect all 
market players (Rao, Bergen, and Davis 2000). 
The literature is inconclusive about the consequences of 
price wars. Although, in general, price wars are believed to 
hurt revenues and long-term prospects for the market play 
ers (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996), other studies sug 
gest that the impact depends on each player's price position 
and role in the price war (Busse 2002; Elzinga and Mills 
1999; Rao, Bergen, and Davis 2000). Although the 
antecedents of price wars have been well documented (see 
our subsequent literature review), empirical research on 
their consequences is sparse. As a recent review concludes, 
"It is unclear what the overall effects of price wars are. 
Price wars are often assumed to lead to losses for the firms 
involved in the battle.... It is, therefore, important to 
research how price wars affect firms in the industry, 
whether these effects are uniformly distributed, and how 
such effects persist in the long run through lower reference 
prices" (Heil and Helsen 2001, p. 96). 
To fill this gap in the literature, we study the conse 
quences of the Dutch supermarket price war on consumer 
purchase behavior. We analyze how the price war affected 
two major components of purchase behavior (Singh, 
Hansen, and Blattberg 2006): store visits and spending 
(money spent per store per week). In particular, we investi 
gate whether the price war led to more shopping around in 
the short run and to decreased spending in the long run. 
Furthermore, we test the hypothesis that the price war made 
store visit and spending decisions more sensitive to weekly 
prices and price image. To examine these issues, we use a 
unique data set that combines consumer hand-scan and per 
ceptual data for a national panel of 1821 households, cover 
ing a period of 90 weeks before and 114 weeks after the 
Table 1 
OVERVIEW OF PRICE WAR ROUNDS 
Date Initiator 
Number of Products 
(Approximately) Emphasis on 
October 20, 2003 
October 27, 2003 
November 10, 2003 
January 19, 2004 
March 8, 2004 
May 10, 2004 
September 20, 2004 
November 13, 2004 
January 30, 2005 
February 21, 2005 
March 7, 2005 
April 4, 2005 
July 28, 2005 
August 23, 2005 
September 12, 2005 
October 31, 2005 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
Edah 
Edah 
Vomar 
Super de Boer 
Albert Heijn 
Albert Heijn 
1000 
550 
300 
500 
100 
100 
1000 
2000 
1000 
100 
250 
250 
1000 
600 
100 
1000 
A-brands 
A-brands 
A-brands and dairy 
A-brands and produce 
Meat 
Cheese 
Private labels 
A-brands 
A-brands, cleaning, and personal care 
Prepared meat/cheese 
A-brands and private labels 
A-brands and private labels 
Not available 
A-brands 
Cleaning and personal care 
A-brands 
Sources: Van Aalst et al. (2005); Holla and Koreman (2006). 
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price war started. For the six-largest national chains, we 
estimate a multivariate heterogeneous Tobit II model that 
includes the short- and long-term effects of the price war on 
store visits, spending, and the sensitivity of these decisions 
to weekly prices and price image. To complement our 
analyses, we not only estimate competitive reaction func 
tions but also assess the effects of the price war on stock 
prices. 
Although the price war initially entailed more shopping 
around and increased spending, spending per visit ulti 
mately dropped because consumers redistributed their pur 
chases across stores. The price war made consumers more 
sensitive to weekly prices and price image, which helped 
both the player that showed an improvement in price image 
(the price war initiator) and the players that already had a 
favorable price image (hard discounters). The price war ini 
tiator managed to halt the slide in its market share, and its 
stock price improved. The losers are the rival mid- and 
high-end chains: Unlike the initiator, their price image did 
not improve, and they suffered from the increased price 
image sensitivity. We expect these results to be generaliz 
able because the Dutch grocery retail industry is representa 
tive of many Western markets on several key indicators 
(Steenkamp et al. 2005, p. 40). Moreover, a recent meta 
analysis has concluded that price elasticities do not differ 
significantly among developed countries (Bijmolt, Van 
Heerde, and Pieters 2005). Thus, the consequences of the 
Dutch price war may hold lessons for retailers in other 
countries facing a similar situation. 
We organize the remainder of this article as follows: In 
the next section, we discuss the price war literature, focus 
ing on the gaps we aim to address. Then, we discuss the 
model used to quantify the price war effects on store visits 
and spending. The subsequent section describes the empiri 
cal setting and details our data sets. We then present the 
estimation outcomes and conclude by providing a discus 
sion and limitations. 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Price War: Definition and Importance 
Price wars are characterized by competing firms strug 
gling to undercut one another's prices (Assael 1990). 
Urbany and Dickson (1991) refer to a "price-cutting 
momentum," or the downward price pressure that drives 
other competitors to follow the initial move. Price is a logi 
cal weapon of choice because it is easy to change fast 
(Kalra, Raju, and Srinivasan 1998). Unlike typical, intense 
price competition, price wars lead to prices that are not sus 
tainable in the long run (Schunk 1999). After an extensive 
review of business press articles and academic literature, 
Heil and Helsen (2001) define a price war as requiring one 
or more of the following conditions: (1) There is a strong 
focus on competitors rather than on consumers, (2) the pric 
ing interaction as a whole is undesirable to firms, (3) the 
competitors neither intend nor expect to ignite a price war, 
(4) the competitive interaction violates industry norms, (5) 
the pricing interaction occurs at a much faster rate than nor 
mal, (6) the direction of pricing is downward, and (7) the 
pricing interplay is not sustainable. Subsequently, we verify 
that the Dutch price war meets most (if not all) of these 
conditions. 
Price wars have become a part of life in a wide range of 
industries (Rao, Bergen, and Davis 2000). Business press 
and academic research have reported on price wars in 
industries including electricity (Fabra and Toro 2005), oil 
(Slade 1992), telecommunications (Young 2004), automo 
biles (Breshnahan 1987), airlines (Busse 2002), fast food 
(Gayatri 2004), and groceries (Barnes 2004). Price wars 
erupt at various levels in the distribution channel and with 
growing frequency and intensity (Heil and Helsen 2001). 
As Rao, Bergen, and Davis (2000, p. 116) conclude, "If 
you're not in a battle currently, you probably will be fairly 
soon." 
Literature on Price Wars 
Academic literature on price wars can be classified into 
three research streams. A first stream comprises game 
theoretic contributions, with a strong focus on price war 
antecedents. An important price war trigger revealed in this 
steam is competitive entry (Elzinga and Mills 1999; Mil 
grom and Roberts 1982). Other factors deemed to be induc 
tive to price wars are declining economic conditions (Eilon 
1993; Slade 1990) and, often related to this, consumers' low 
(and/or declining) brand loyalty and high (and/or increas 
ing) price sensitivity (Klemperer 1989; Sairamesh and 
Kephart 2000). 
A second stream includes more managerial research. 
This work reflects on the link between price wars and firm 
strategies and characteristics. Companies with high exit 
barriers (Heil and Helsen 2001) and high stakes in the mar 
ket or a worsened financial situation (Busse 2002) are more 
inclined to initiate a price war or to enter an ongoing battle. 
In doing so, these firms hope to bring about a market clear 
out and to increase their profit from reduced competition in 
the long run (Fudenberg and Tir?le 1986; Klemperer 1989), 
or at least to halt the loss of customers and maybe even 
reattract clientele (Elzinga and Mills 1999; Klemperer 
1989). A widely advertised price cut may also establish a 
more favorable price image (Busse 2002; Rao, Bergen, and 
Davis 2000). 
The third stream consists of empirical research docu 
menting price war consequences. Unfortunately, despite the 
importance of price wars, such empirical contributions are 
extremely scarce and suffer from some limitations. 
Although the studies by Green and Porter (1984), Breshna 
han (1987), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Levenstein 
(1997) provide a glimpse of the nature and impact of price 
wars, the data set limitations of these studies do not allow 
the research to go beyond a rough empirical assessment. On 
the basis of 15 case studies in a diverse range of industries, 
Heil and Helsen (2001) provide some preliminary evidence 
on overall price war effects, including dwindling prices, 
declining image and revenues, and profit erosion for the 
parties involved. They also provide initial indications of 
increased shelf price elasticities for incumbent brands of a 
personal care product following a price war. They conclude 
(p. 86) that though their "descriptive statistics illustrate the 
importance and scope of price war phenomena,... more rig 
orous empirical research is needed." We help fill in this gap 
by testing hypotheses on price war consequences with an 
empirical model, which we estimate using a unique and 
rich data set. 
This content downloaded from 88.255.245.252 on Sun, 26 Oct 2014 04:38:26 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Winners and Losers in a Major Price War 503 
Price War Effects on Store Visits, Spending, and Price 
Sensitivity: Hypotheses 
Henderson (1997) suggests that in the absence of a 
strong and sustainable cost advantage, price wars are "good 
for absolutely nothing" and may lead to dramatic losses for 
the market players involved. In this section, we develop a 
more refined picture of how price wars affect consumer 
spending, leading to a negative impact of the price war on 
some market players and a positive impact for others. 
Given our focus on a retail setting, we decompose this 
spending effect into its two major components: store visits 
and spending, after a consumer decides to buy in the store. 
Moreover, we distinguish between the price war's main 
effect on these performance measures and its moderating 
impact on consumers' sensitivity to weekly store prices and 
to overall store price image. Finally, we expect substantial 
differences in the price war's performance effects in the 
short run versus the long run. The latter is important from a 
managerial perspective because great initial results may 
encourage retailers to cut prices further, even when the 
long-term effects of competitive escalation are disastrous 
(Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999; Ghemawat 1991). Figure 2 
displays our conceptual framework and hypotheses. 
Main Effects of the Price War on Store Visits and Spending 
Short-term effects. By definition, price wars constitute 
market disruptions. Market players announce major strat 
egy changes and formulate unprecedented claims on 
reduced prices. For example, the two major high-service/ 
high-price Dutch retailers stated that shopping in their 
chain allows for "dramatic savings" on grocery spending 
(Albert Heijn) and that "gigantic" benefits are to be reaped 
from permanent price reductions (Super de Boer). Such 
widely publicized claims may shake up consumers' former 
beliefs about the market and lead them to reconsider their 
established purchase patterns, in terms of both store visits 
and spending. 
In the short run (i.e., right after the start of a price war), 
consumers face increased uncertainty about which stores 
offer the best value for the money. As a result, they are 
likely to adopt risk-reducing strategies (Blattberg and Nes 
lin 1989), engaging in comparison shopping to update pre 
vious information (Mick and Fournier 1998). In other 
words, they visit more chains, at least to check out the 
(new) prices in these stores. Thus: 
H^ The price war leads to an overall increase in store visits in 
the short run. 
At the same time, the price war's influence on spending 
is subject to three forces. First, the price war leads to lower 
prices, and as a result, spending is reduced even when 
quantities remain the same. In our approach, we focus on 
the impact of the price war on spending and control for 
these price-driven changes. This impact may be negative 
because of the second force; consistent with the argument 
on uncertainty, consumers may redistribute their purchases 
across stores, thus reducing the probability of systemati 
cally getting the worst deal (Fox and Hoch 2005). Con 
versely, the short-term impact of a price war on spending 
may be positive because of the third force; the sudden and 
heavily publicized price drop may create an unexpected 
"psychological income" or "windfall" effect. For example, 
a field experiment found that when given a monetary 
reward before entering a store, shoppers spent more in the 
store, in excess of the monetary reward (Heilman, 
Nakamoto, and Rao 2002). In a similar vein, the price war's 
sudden promise of "dramatic savings" may induce con 
sumers to "burn a hole in their pockets"?that is, to 
increase their spending disproportionally?because the sav 
Figure 2 
THE EFFECTS OF A PRICE WAR ON (1) STORE VISIT AND 
SPENDING AND (2) SENSITIVITIES TO WEEKLY PRICE AND 
PRICE IMAGE 
Store Visits: Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
Price war 
"3a" 
~~ 
ST: -.058 
LT: n.s. 
H^STh 
ST: .020 
(LT:-.011) 
H4a: + 
ST: n.s. 
LT: .005 
Weekly price 
Store visits 
Price image 
Spending: Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
Price war 
H3b:~ 
ST: -.084 
LT: -.026 
H2: LT 
- 
(ST: .008) 
LT.-.004 
H4b: + 
ST: n.s. 
LT: .004 
Weekly price 
+ if spending is 
price inelastic ? if spending is 
price elastic 
Spending 
Price image 
Notes: ST = short term, and LT = long term. n.s. = not significant. 
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ings enable them to afford better-quality brands and to 
enjoy the transactional utility of getting a great deal (Chan 
don, Wansink, and Laurent 2000). Given these opposing 
forces, we investigate the price war's short-term effects on 
spending in an exploratory way. 
Long-term effects. Compared with the short run, there is 
little reason for the price war to increase store visits in the 
long run. Indeed, consumers in mature markets tend to 
develop stable purchase patterns, which are only temporar 
ily disrupted by marketing activities (Ehrenberg 1988). 
Although specific stores may benefit from increased visits 
in the long run, consumers are unlikely to increase the over 
all frequency of store visits permanently. 
In contrast, the price war is likely to decrease spending in 
the long run, even after we control for the changes driven 
by price reductions. Analogous to our argument for the 
short-term effect, we expect that a shopping environment 
characterized by an escalating price war induces consumers 
to redistribute their total grocery spending across the stores 
they visit. In contrast, the opposing force of a windfall 
effect is most likely only short lived because families are 
unlikely to consume much more food overall, even when 
prices drop substantially. An analogous result holds at the 
category level; that is, although weekly price promotions 
may expand the category substantially, they do so only 
temporarily (Pauwels, Hanssens, and Siddarth 2002; Van 
Heerde, Leeflang, and Wittink 2004). Because we believe 
that the negative force is present (splitting the grocery bill 
across stores) and that the positive (windfall) effect is 
absent in the long run, we expect that the price war will 
reduce spending. 
H2: The price war leads to an overall decrease in spending in 
the long run. 
Moderating Effects of a Price War: Consumer Sensitivity to 
Weekly Prices and Price Image 
A unique feature of a price war is that pricing inter 
actions occur at a much faster rate than previously (Heil 
and Helsen 2001). Intensive price interactions make price a 
more easily accessible attribute, which, as a result, 
increases its importance as a purchase criterion (Wanke. 
Bohner, and Jurkowitsch 1997). Lab experiments by 
Wathieu, Muthukrshnan, and Bronnenberg (2004) show 
strong evidence for this effect in a brand setting; specifi 
cally, offering and retracting discounts decreases the subse 
quent choice share for high-priced brands but increases the 
choice share of low-priced brands. 
A price war between stores may enhance a consumer's 
reliance on two types of price information. First, a con 
sumer is confronted with the actual, objective prices the 
stores charge, which may vary weekly as a result of regular 
price changes or promotional deals. These weekly prices 
determine how much the consumer actually pays for a spe 
cific product basket in a specific store and week. We define 
the store visit sensitivity to price as the response parameter 
of weekly store price in the model for store visit probability 
and the spending sensitivity to price as the response 
parameter of weekly store price in the model for spending 
(for more details, see the "Model" section). Consistent with 
a preference for lower prices, we expect that store visit sen 
sitivity to price is negative and that spending sensitivity to 
price is positive in the case of price-inelastic demand and 
negative in the case of price-elastic demand (see Figure 2). 
Second, consumers also hold subjective summary views 
of the stores' overall price appeal. As M?gi and Yulander 
(2005) show, these subjective price images constitute a sep 
arate price dimension that, at best, is moderately associated 
with actual objective prices and is more stable over time. 
Price image differentiates stores on the basis of their per 
ceived price positioning. This perceived price positioning 
has been found to exert an important influence on store 
selection (Arnold, Oum, and Tigert 1983; Severin, Lou 
vi?re, and Finn 2001), beyond objective weekly store 
prices. We define the store visit sensitivity to price image 
(spending sensitivity to price image) as the response 
parameter of price image in the model for store visit proba 
bility (spending probability), and we expect both sensitivi 
ties to be positive (see Figure 2). 
Consistent with this dual retail price construct, increased 
sensitivity to weekly prices and price image triggered by a 
price war may materialize in two ways (Bell and Lattin 
1998; Galata, Bucklin, and Hanssens 1999; Lai and Rao 
1997). First, the price war may stimulate more opportunis 
tic buying behavior, with consumers shopping around more 
to benefit from weekly deals on prices (Bell and Lattin 
1998; Fox and Hoch 2005). Thus, consumers will be more 
responsive to stores' actual weekly prices (Dr?ze, Nisol, 
and Vilcassim 2004; Fox and Hoch 2005): 
H3: The price war increases (a) the sensitivity of store visits to 
weekly prices and (b) the sensitivity of spending to weekly 
prices (i.e., the price war makes the corresponding response 
parameter more negative). 
Second, responding more strongly to weekly prices 
requires increased effort from consumers. They may also 
engage in other, more general impression-based forms of 
price-oriented shopping. A consumer's enhanced focus on 
price then translates into systematically seeking out stores 
with a favorable overall price image (Bell, Ho, and Tang 
1998; Galata, Bucklin, and Hanssens 1999; Rhee and Bell 
2002) and allocating larger shares of wallet to these stores. 
This leads to additional moderating price war influences: 
H4: The price war increases (a) the sensitivity of store visits to 
price image and (b) the sensitivity of spending to price 
image (i.e., the price war makes the corresponding response 
parameter more positive). 
Because it is an empirical question whether H3 and H4 
imply sensitivity changes in the short run and/or long run, 
our tests allow for both possibilities. Note that the hypothe 
sized increase in price image sensitivity would entail a dif 
ferential impact of the price war on different market play 
ers. This would be especially troublesome for high-end 
chains, but it might actually help low-end competitors in 
the long run (Boulding, Lee, and Staelin 1994). As such, 
the price war may make the price differences between 
stores more salient, causing stores with worse price images 
to suffer. 
Because price wars are different from a period of intense 
price promotions (Heil and Helsen 2001), we test the price 
war hypotheses and control for price promotion-intensive 
weeks (we provide more details in the subsection "Indepen 
dent Variables"). To the best of our knowledge, no empiri 
cal study has systematically distinguished the impact of a 
This content downloaded from 88.255.245.252 on Sun, 26 Oct 2014 04:38:26 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Winners and Losers in a Major Price War 505 
price war on consumers' store visits, spending, and weekly 
price and price image sensitivity. This is an important 
gap because the net outcome for firms involved in a price 
war hinges on these (possibly countervailing) effects. 
Researchers used to lack the necessary data on consumer 
perceptions and behavior before and during the price war. 
Our data set on the recent Dutch retailing price war enables 
us to overcome this hurdle. Before we provide details on 
the data set, however, we outline the model. 
MODEL 
To study the consequences of the price war for national 
retail chains, we model the purchase behavior of a national 
panel of Dutch households before and after the price war 
started. A household faces choices along two dimensions: 
which of the stores to visit (possibly more than one in a 
given week) and how much to spend at each store. We 
develop a model for the store visit decision and In spending 
level of every household h (h = 1, ..., H), for every chain i 
(i = 1, ..., S), and in every week t (t = 1, ..., T). Given that 
a household may visit multiple stores in one week and 
given the left-censored nature of household spending, we 
specify a multivariate Tobit II model (e.g., Fox, Mont 
gomery, and Lodish 2004; Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg 
2006). A store visit of household h for store i in week t (zhit) 
is described by a multivariate probit model: 
(1) Zh,.=?1?fZ??i,>0 [O if otherwise 
In a given week t, household h may visit multiple stores. 
Thus, zhit equals 1 for those stores. The latent variable, z*hit, 
is modeled through a linear model: 
(2) zhit 
= 
lhi+xhitCh 
+ uhit. 
Conditional on a store visit (zhit = 1), we model yhit, the In 
of spending (in euro cents) by household h in store i in 
week t as follows: 
(3) yhit= ?hi+ vhit?h +^it 
Consistent with the extant literature that uses Tobit mod 
els for store visits and spending (Fox, Montgomery, and 
Lodish 2004; Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg 2006), we 
model the logarithm of spending (conditional on a store 
visit) because its distribution is closer to normal than the 
distribution of spending. The independent variables in the 
store visit equations (xhit) and spending equations (vhit) 
need not be the same. We specify the independent variables 
after we give more details about the data. The intercepts in 
Equations 2 and 3 capture individual-specific store prefer 
ences. We assume that these intercepts are randomly dis 
tributed around store means: 
(4) lhi 
= 
\|/i + xhi, and 
(5) ahi = ?i + ?hi. 
The stores visited and the amounts spent depend on con 
sumers' time and budget constraints and are interdependent 
between stores. Our model allows for this by embedding 
Equations 2 and 3 in a multivariate framework. More 
specifically, we assume that the error vectors uht 
= 
(uhlt, ..., 
uhSt)' and eht = (ehlt, ..., ehSt)' follow a joint multivariate 
normal distribution, with a full variance-covariance matrix: 
(eht> uht) 
~ MVN(0, Z). Intrinsic store preferences for visits 
and spending may also be correlated, leading to a joint mul 
tivariate normal distribution for the error terms in Equations 
4 and 5 as well: (& T^)' 
~ MVN(0, V). We also allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity in response coefficients. Specifi 
cally, we assume that the coefficients from the store visit 
and spending equations are jointly distributed multivariate 
normal: (??, ?h)' 
~ N[(?, %')', SI], We estimate this mul 
tivariate heterogeneous Tobit II model using Markov chain 
Monte Carlo procedures. Technical details appear in the 
Web Appendix, Part A (http://wwwmarketingpower.com/ 
jmroct08). 
THE DUTCH PRICE WAR IN GROCERY RETAILING: 
SETTING AND DATA 
Empirical Setting 
Previously, we described the Dutch supermarket price 
war in detail. How does it compare with the definitional 
conditions of a price war in Heil and Helsen's (2001) 
study? First, as for the strong focus on competitors rather 
than on consumers, the rival chains Super de Boer, Edah, 
and C1000 reacted within two days to Albert Heijn's initial 
move, which does not allow enough time to assess con 
sumer responses fully. This fast competitive reaction might 
have been provoked by the goal Albert Heijn began at 
the start of the price war: "to become less expensive than 
the market average" (Baltesen 2006b, p. 1). To verify that 
competitive interactions intensified because of the price 
war, we estimate competitive reaction functions (Leeflang 
and Wittink 1996) before and after the price war started. 
The results reveal more (significant) reactions after the start 
of the price war for every retailer than before (for details, 
see the Web Appendix, Part B, at http://www.marketing 
power.com/jmroct08). 
Second, pricing interaction as a whole is undesirable to 
firms because it places a lot of pressure on already tight 
margins (Van Aalst et al. 2005). Third, although we cannot 
peer into managers' minds to assess whether the competi 
tors neither intended nor expected to ignite a price war, 
there is no evidence of such intent (Baarsma and De Nooij 
2005). Fourth, the claim that the competitive interaction 
violates industry norms is evident from lawsuits brought by 
large national brand suppliers against the price war initiator 
for selling far below the recommended price. In addition, 
smaller suppliers and grocery stores are facing bankruptcy 
(Van Aalst et al. 2005). As a result, the Dutch Ministry of 
Commerce opened an investigation to consider outlawing 
below-cost pricing (Baarsma and De Nooij 2005).2 Fifth, 
the pricing interaction occurs at a much faster rate than nor 
mal (i.e., days instead of weeks/months) and the direction 
of pricing is downward, as Figure 1 illustrates. Finally, the 
2In Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, and 
Spain, law prohibits retailers from selling at a price below cost. Other 
European countries, such as Denmark, Germany, Finland, Austria, Swe 
den, and the United Kingdom, are similar to the Netherlands in that they 
do not explicitly impose that selling prices must exceed costs (Baarsma 
and De Nooij 2005). 
This content downloaded from 88.255.245.252 on Sun, 26 Oct 2014 04:38:26 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
506 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, OCTOBER 2008 
pricing interplay is not sustainable because hundreds of 
items are now sold below cost in Dutch supermarkets (Van 
Aalst et al. 2005). 
Although most sources agree that the price war appears 
detrimental to grocery retailers on average, there are mixed 
signals when it comes to individual players, especially by 
the time the price war seems to have taken its full effect. By 
the end of 2005, after more than two years of price warfare, 
Laurus (the holding company of Edah and Super de Boer) 
was on the edge of bankruptcy, but Albert Heijn claims to 
have achieved its goals, reporting a revival of revenues and 
profit (Baltesen 2006a). In a similar vein, Figure 3, which 
displays market share for the six leading supermarkets in 
the 2002-2005 period, indicates a strong post-price war 
decline for Edah, whereas the slide in Albert Heijn 's market 
share before the price war is halted. A key question 
remains: What explains the difference in price war conse 
quences for these key market players? By disentangling the 
price war impact from that of other drivers of chain revenue 
and by unraveling its effect on separate revenue compo 
nents, our model and empirical results shed light on these 
issues. 
Figure 3 
QUARTERLY MARKET SHARES OF THE SIX NATIONAL CHAINS (WITHIN THE SUBMARKET OF THE SIX CHAINS) 
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Notes: These market shares are based on the representative sample of 1821 households used in the analyses. 
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Data Sources 
Our data set combines several sources. First, we use pur 
chase records from the Dutch GfK consumer hand-scan 
panel across a period of four and a half years (July 1, 2001 
December 31, 2005). Panel members scan at home all their 
purchases at all Dutch grocery retailers, and the data are 
sent electronically to GfK Benelux. This GfK panel con 
sists of 4400 households, which represent a stratified 
national sample. We use this source to operationalize our 
dependent variables (store visits and spending) and the 
household- and store-specific weekly prices. A unique 
advantage of consumer hand-scan data (over in-store 
scanned data obtained through household identification 
cards) is that the market research agency does not need the 
permission for data collection from the retail chains. Such 
permission is increasingly problematic in both Europe 
(especially for the hard discounters) and the United States 
(Wal-Mart). 
GfK also provided household perceptions of grocery 
retailing chains. Every six months, some of the panelists are 
surveyed on their perceptions of price image and produce 
quality. On the basis of these surveys, GfK prepares Christ 
mas and summer reports for the Dutch grocery industry. In 
addition to these biyearly reports, GfK conducted a survey 
a few weeks after the price war started. We obtained the 
store image data at the individual household level for the 
same period, and for each week t, we assigned the percep 
tions from the measurement moment that is closest to week 
t. For the households that were not surveyed for a specific 
Christmas or summer report, we imputed image data using 
a two-way linear model?a typical and commonly used 
best-fit imputation approach (see Little and Rubin 1987, 
Chap. 2). 
We obtained data from Information Resources Inc. and 
Publi Info (both in the Netherlands) on weekly feature and 
display for all items sold in Dutch grocery retailing chains 
across the same period. We used these variables to opera 
tionalize household- and store-specific feature and display 
variables. Finally, Reed Business provided the sizes (in 
square meters) and the locations (zip codes) for all Dutch 
grocery stores and each year in our data set. The store size 
data are a useful proxy for assortment size of each chain's 
store nearest to the household. We combined the store zip 
codes with the GfK household panelists' zip codes to com 
pute the Euclidean distance between a household and the 
closest store from each chain. 
Data Selection 
Because the panel composition changes over time, we 
decided to select the 1821 households that remained in the 
panel across the four-and-a-half-year period. We use the 
first 30 weeks (Week 27 of 2001-Week 4 of 2002) as the 
initialization period for determining households' spending 
across categories and for the lagged store visit and spend 
ing variables. We used the remaining 204 weeks (Week 5 of 
2002-Week 52 of 2005) for model calibration. The price 
war started in Week 43 of 2003, and thus we have 90 weeks 
before the start of the price war and 114 weeks afterward. 
This seems sufficient to measure long-term effects because 
by the end of 2005, the price war was in its aftermath (Van 
Aalst 2006). The full data set consists of 2,228,904 obser 
vations: purchases of 1821 households at six retail chains 
over 204 weeks. 
We model store visit and spending at the six largest 
chains with national coverage, which jointly comprise 70% 
share of the 2002 market. To illustrate the positioning of 
these chains before the price war, Figure 4 summarizes the 
store perception data in two main dimensions (according to 
GfK): service and value for the money. Albert Heijn is the 
market leader that initiated the price war. As illustrated by 
its scores on price image and produce quality (see Table 2), 
Albert Heijn is a high-price, high-service chain, which also 
applies to Super de Boer. The middle segment comprises 
two chains: C1000, with good scores for service and value, 
and Edah, with low ratings on both dimensions. The two 
hard discounters (low price, low service) are Aldi and Lidl. 
Notably, the price war led to a strongly improved price 
image for Albert Heijn, as Figure 5 shows. 
Actual weekly prices hardly decreased across the four 
and a half years of data (Table 2), which may be surprising 
given the magnitude of the price war. Two comments are 
relevant here. First, the prices we report in Table 2 are nom 
inal price indexes. As Baltesen (2006a) points out, the cor 
responding decline in real prices was much stronger: In the 
absence of the price war, Dutch food prices would have 
been 8.2% higher than they actually were. Second, although 
many items were reduced in price, the majority of the 
stores' SKUs were not (and some prices of heavily featured 
SKUs increased again after an initial advertised price drop), 
implying that price drops for the entire basket remained 
modest. 
Independent Variables 
Store selection and spending depend on a trade-off 
between shopping benefits and costs (Bell, Ho, and Tang 
1998; Tang, Bell, and Ho 2001), and Table 3 summarizes 
the corresponding independent variables. As store benefits 
variables, we include store price image, produce quality (an 
indicator of general quality), store surface (an indicator of 
assortment size), and feature and display variables (Bell, 
Ho, and Tang 1998; Fox, Montgomery, and Lodish 2004; 
Sirohi, McLaughlin, and Wittink 1998; Tang, Bell, and Ho 
2001).3 Store familiarity or spending habits affect store vis 
its and spending as well (Bell, Ho, and Tang 1998; Rhee 
and Bell 2002). Such state dependence can be captured 
with lagged purchase indicators (Ailawadi, Gedenk, and 
Neslin 1999; Seetharaman 2003). To capture a variety of 
shopping visit and spending patterns, we use four lagged 
variables that represent prior store visits and spending, one 
for each of the four preceding weeks. 
We include two independent variables for store costs: (1) 
store distance, representing fixed costs, and (2) weekly 
prices paid to acquire a basket of products, representing 
variable costs (Bawa and Ghosh 1999; Bell, Ho, and Tang 
3We include feature in the store visit model but omit it from the spend 
ing equation because feature promotions represent out-of-store communi 
cation intended to enhance store visits. Similarly, we include display in the 
spending model but exclude it from the store visit model because this mar 
keting instrument is observed only by shoppers inside the store. We veri 
fied both restrictions and found that posterior interval for the display 
parameter includes zero in the store visit model, and the same applies for 
the feature parameter in the spending model. 
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Figure 4 
POSITIONING OF THE SIX MAJOR DUTCH RETAIL CHAINS IN SUMMER 2002 
Source: GFK (2003). 
Table 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SIX CHAINS BEFORE (PRE) AND AFTER (POST) THE START OF THE PRICE WAR 
Albert Heijn 
(Service) 
Super de Boer 
(Service) 
C1000 
(Middle) 
Edah 
(Middle) 
Aldi 
(Discount) 
Lidl 
(Discount) 
Pre- or post-price war perioda Pre Post 
Market share 32% 31% 
Weekly store visits .36 .35 
Weekly spending (given 
spending > 0) 28.92 27.12 27.74 26.03 
Price image (1 = "lowest," 
and 7 = "highest") 5.1 5.5 
Produce quality (1 
= "lowest," 
and 7 = "highest") 6.4 6.5 
Distance to panelists (km) 2.3 2.3 
Store surface (m2) 1326 1385 
Price (index) 1.19 1.20 
Featureb 3.09 2.67 
Displayb 2.37 2.69 
Pre 
14% 
.16 
5.4 
6.2 
4.0 
867 
1.11 
3.45 
2.81 
Post 
13% 
.15 
5.4 
6.1 
4.0 
979 
1.12 
2.97 
2.56 
Pre Post 
24% 24% 
.27 .27 
28.03 27.57 
6.0 6.1 
6.2 
3.1 
838 
.98 
1.46 
1.40 
6.2 
3.0 
927 
.96 
1.45 
1.41 
Pre Post 
10% 8% 
.14 .11 
24.07 22.17 
5.8 5.8 
5.5 
5.1 
1008 
1.01 
4.05 
3.20 
5.5 
5.2 
1024 
1.01 
2.40 
2.82 
Pre Post 
16% 18% 
.24 .25 
20.66 21.70 
6.9 6.7 
4.3 
3.2 
421 
.60 
.31 
.31 
4.5 
3.2 
428 
.58 
3.5 
3.5 
Pre 
4% 
.08 
6.7 
4.7 
7.0 
613 
.59 
1.68 
1.68 
Post 
7% 
.12 
15.96 17.14 
6.7 
5.0 
5.3 
622 
.59 
3.45 
3.45 
aThe pre-price war period runs from January 2002 to October 19, 2003; the post-price war period runs from October 20, 2003, to the end of 2005. 
bThis variable is the product of the percentage of stores that carry the promotion times the percentage of products that are promoted. It varies from 0 (no 
activity whatsoever) to 10,000 (100% of the products in 100% of the stores are promoted). 
1998; Popkowski-Leszczyc, Sinha, and Sahgal 2004).4 
Importantly, because we mean-center weekly prices for 
each store-household combination, they capture longitudi 
nal variation only, whereas the (untransformed) price image 
variable captures both cross-sectional and longitudinal var 
iation. Furthermore, we include seasonal dummies (Weeks 
1, 51, 52, and Easter). 
To test the hypotheses, we include price war variables, 
based on the price war rounds outlined in Table 1. We 
define the step variable PWRound as the cumulative num 
ber of items that were reduced in price since the start of the 
price war. Its coefficient in the model for store visit and 
spending represents the price war's long-term (permanent) 
4As we discussed in the "Research Background and Hypotheses" sec 
tion, we need to include weekly price as an independent variable in the 
models for store incidence and spending. This enables the price war 
variable (which we discuss subsequently) to capture the impact of the price 
war while controlling for mere price reductions. To avoid endogeneity 
issues, we use purchases from the initialization sample to define each 
household's basket of products rather than the current week's basket. 
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Figure 5 
PRICE IMAGE FOR THE SIX CHAINS OVER TIME 
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effect. We also use its first difference, the pulse variable 
Pulse_PWRound, which represents the extra number of 
items reduced in price in a particular week. Its response 
coefficient represents the short-term effect of the price war 
on store visits and incidence. The use of step and pulse 
variables, combined with lagged endogenous variables, 
captures a wide variety of dynamic effects (Hanssens, Par 
sons, and Schultz 2001, pp. 295-96); at the same time, this 
specification is still parsimonious and tractable.5 In both the 
store visit and the spending equations, we also test whether 
the price war affects consumers' sensitivity to weekly prices 
and price image, in both the short and the long run. To that 
end, we use the interactions between these variables and the 
pulse and step price war variables: Pulse_PWRound x 
InPrice, Pulse_PWRound x Pricelmage, PWRound x 
InPrice, and PWRound x Pricelmage. 
Finally, consumers may become more price and price 
image sensitive not only in the course of the price war but 
also in other periods of intensified price promotions in 
which supermarkets tend to engage. To identify these peri 
ods, we define a new dummy, Promweek, which is 1 in pro 
motion intensive weeks (average price index across stores 
is 2.5% or more below the yearly average) and 0 otherwise. 
This operationalization identifies promotion-intensive peri 
ods that make intuitive sense because they largely corre 
spond to the periods when households are on tighter budg 
ets (beginning of the year and end of summer). We include 
the main effect of promotion week and its interaction with 
weekly prices (Promweek x InPrice) and price image 
(Promweek x Pricelmage) in the models for store visits and 
spending. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of 
Promweek (based on a price that is 2% or 3% lower than 
average). 
Table 2 shows that the means of several store activities 
change between the periods before and after the price war 
started. For example, the average distance to a Lidl store 
decreases from 7.0 to 5.3 kilometers, reflecting Lidl's 
increase in the number of outlets. In addition, the average 
store surface areas tend to increase over time (because of 
either remodeling or new stores). Moreover, the feature and 
display activities increase for Aldi and Lidl and decrease 
for some other players. Our model includes control (inde 
pendent) variables for each of these changes to obtain unbi 
ased estimates for the price war effects. 
RESULTS 
Store Visits 
We present the store visit results in the left-hand part of 
Table 4. All benefit variables (Pricelmage, ProduceQuality, 
StoreSurface, Feature, and LagVisitl-4) have positive 
effects on store visit probabilities (and their 95% posterior 
interval excludes zero). The positive impact of InStore 
Surface (.155) is consistent with store size being a proxy 
for assortment size. The coefficients of lagged visit (.235, 
.298, .283, and .264) indicate the expected positive state 
dependence. As for costs, we find that a greater distance 
between a household and a store (i.e., more travel time and 
costs) has the expected negative effect on store visit 
probability (-.502). In addition, the effect of price is 
negative (-.097), as we expected. The seasonal effect esti 
mates indicate a decreased propensity to visit grocery stores 
in the Christmas week (Week 52: -.107) and in the first 
week of the year (Week 1: -.458), possibly because stores 
limit their opening hours (grocery stores are closed on 
December 25 and 26 and on January 1), and consumers pre 
fer to stay at home with family and friends. On Easter, the 
store visit propensity goes up (.073), plausibly because con 
sumers want to shop for holiday meals, and the longer 
opening hours (relative to Christmas) enable them to do so. 
We find that during promotion-intensive weeks, consumers 
go more often to stores (Promweek: .24). In addition, in 
these weeks, their store visit decision is more sensitive to 
weekly prices (Promweek x InPrice: -.350). Both effects 
make intuitive sense. 
Focusing on the impact of the price war variables, we 
note several findings (see also Figure 2). Consistent with 
Hj, the overall store visit propensity temporarily increases 
because of the price war; the coefficient for Pulse_ 
PWRound is positive (.020). However, in line with expecta 
tions, this traffic increase does not persist. In the long run, 
the price war even reduces visits for the average store; the 
coefficient of PWRound is negative (-.011). This result 
must be interpreted against the finding that the price war 
makes the store visit decision more sensitive to weekly 
prices and price image, consistent with Heil and Helsen's 
5It is unlikely that retailers set basket prices or decide on the number of 
items to reduce in price as a function of same-week spending levels of 
individual households, especially in a competitor-centered price war set 
ting. This justifies our choice of treating weekly price and price war 
variables as exogenous. 
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Table 3 
OVERVIEW OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN THE STORE VISIT AND SPENDING MODELS 
Variable Ope rationalization Variable Operationalization 
Store Benefits 
Pricelmagehit Price image of store i for household h in week t 
measured on a ten-point scale (1 = "worst," and 
10 = "best").3 
ProduceQualityhit Produce-quality image of store i for household h in 
week t measured on a ten-point scale (1 = "worst," 
and 10 = "best").a This is an important indicator of 
perceived chain quality. 
Seasonalities 
Weeklt,Week51t, 
Week52t, Easter 
Price War Variables 
PWRoundt 
Dummy variables for Week 1, Week 51, Week 52, 
and Easter, respectively. 
Cumulative price war round variable for permanent 
effects: 0 before start of price war and equal to the 
cumulative number of items reduced in price up to 
time t (see Table 1); scaled by dividing by 1000. 
lnStoreSurfacehit In floor surface of closest store of chain i to 
household h in week t.a This variable is an 
important indicator of assortment size. 
Featurehit Feature activity of store i in week t for household 
h: weighted average of store i's feature activities in 
category c in week t with household h's category 
shares as weightsa'b (only in store visit model). 
Displayhit Display activity of store i in week t for household 
h: weighted average of store i's display activities in 
category c in week t with household h's category 
shares as weightsa'b'c (only in spending model). 
Pulse_PWRoundt Pulse price war round variable for temporary 
effects: 0 before start of price war and equal to the 
number of items reduced in price at time t (see 
Table 1); scaled by dividing by 1000. 
PWRoundt x Interaction between cumulative price war round 
lnPricehit variable and In price. 
PWRoundt x Interaction between cumulative price war round 
Pricelmagehit variable and price image. 
Pulse_PWRoundt x Interaction between pulse price war round 
lnPricehit variable and In weekly price. 
LagVisit/hit 
LaglnExpend/hit 
Store Costs 
lnDistancehit 
lnPricehit 
Indicator for store visit (store i) by household h in 
week t - /, where / = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
In spending for household h in store i in week t 
- 
/, 
where/= 1,2,3,4. 
In distance (km) between household h and store i 
in week t.a 
In weekly price of store i for household h in week 
t: a weighted average of store i's price in category 
c in week t (p?it), with household h's category 
shares as weights.b'd'e 
Pulse_PWRoundt x 
Pricelmagehit 
Promotion Week Variables 
Interaction between pulse price war round 
variable and price image. 
Promweekt Dummy for price promotion intensive week: 1 if 
average price across chains is 2.5% or more below 
average and 0 if otherwise. 
Promweekt x Interaction between promotion week and In weekly 
lnPricehit price. 
Promweekt x Interaction between promotion week and price 
Pricelmage image. 
aObtained from the measurement moment that is closest to week t. 
bThis variable is mean-centered for each household-store combination to use longitudinal information only to assess its effect. 
cThis variable is the product of the percentage of stores carrying the promotion times the percentage of products that are promoted. It varies from 0 (no 
activity) to 10,000 (100% of the products in 100% of the stores are promoted). 
dA benefit of mean-centering described in note "b" is that InPrice is only weakly correlated with Pricelmage: p 
= -.015. 
eTo allow for meaningful aggregation across categories with different units (e.g., ounces, liters) into a weekly store price, category prices (p?h) are 
expressed as an index by dividing them by the across-store average unit price for the category in the initialization period. 
(2001) prediction. Specifically, we find support for H3a in 
the short run (but not in the long run); the sensitivity of 
store visits to weekly prices increases temporarily at each 
new price war round (Pulse_PwRound x InPrice: -.058). 
For H4a, we find support only in the long run (PWRound x 
Pricelmage: .005), implying that price image becomes a 
more important criterion for store visit as the cumulative 
number of items reduced in price increases. 
Spending 
The estimates for the In spending equation appear in the 
right-hand part of Table 4. All the benefit variables have the 
expected positive effects. Spending increases with Price 
Image (.008), ProduceQuality (.010) and Display (.003). 
Moreover, it increases with InStoreSurface (.098), consis 
tent with the notion that larger assortments allow for the 
fulfillment of more consumer needs, and with lagged 
spending (.002, .009, .010, and .009), consistent with posi 
tive state dependence. On the cost side, a longer distance to 
the store leads to less spending (-.116). This may be true 
either because transportation from the store to home by foot 
or bike (which is common in the Netherlands) becomes 
increasingly difficult when there are more groceries to carry 
or because consumers visit these far-away stores for fill-in 
trips on their way home from work. The elasticity of spend 
ing to weekly prices is positive (.282) but lower than 1. This 
implies that before the price war, the elasticity of quantity 
to price was negative but inelastic. As for seasonalities, the 
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Table 4 
POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSE PARAMETERS 
Model for Store Visit Model for In Spending 
Percentiles of^ 
Standard 
Deviation 
Across 
Households Percentiles of (0 
2.5 50 97.5 (Based on il) 2.5 50 97.5 
Standard 
Deviation 
Across 
Households 
(Based on Qj 
Pricelmage 
ProduceQuality 
InStoreSurface 
Feature 
Display 
Lag Visit 1 
LagVisit2 
LagVisit3 
LagVisit4 
LaglnExpendl 
LaglnExpend2 
LaglnExpend3 
LaglnExpend4 
InDistance 
InPrice 
Weekl 
Week 51 
Week 52 
Easter 
PWRound 
Pulse_PWRound 
PWRound x InPrice 
PWRound x Pricelmage 
Pulse_PWRound x InPrice 
PulseJPWRound x Pricelmage 
Promweek 
Promweek x InPrice 
Promweek x Pricelmage 
.000 
.003 
.139 
.001 
.220 
.287 
.273 
.251 
-.526 
-.107 
-.478 
.019 
-.122 
.062 
-.013 
.008 
-.005 
.003 
-.086 
-.009 
.013 
-.364 
-.001 
.009* 
.011* 
.155* 
.002* 
.235* 
.298* 
.283* 
.264* 
-.502* 
-.097* 
-.458* 
.040* 
-.107* 
.073* 
-.011* 
.020* 
.009 
.005* 
-.058* 
.004 
.024* 
-.350* 
.009 
.018 
.017 
.171 
.003 
.250 
.312 
.292 
.273 
-.476 
-.082 
-.443 
.060 
-.089 
.083 
-.009 
.030 
.026 
.007 
-.021 
.016 
.032 
-.338 
.016 
.078 
.033 
.108 
.006 
.269 
.168 
.148 
.139 
.321 
.075 
.133 
.065 
.065 
.060 
.034 
.030 
.045 
.029 
.108 
.024 
.029 
.055 
.040 
.002 
.006 
.089 
.002 
.001 
.008 
.009 
.008 
-.142 
.269 
-.227 
.115 
.014 
.119 
-.005 
.000 
-.035 
.002 
-.099 
-.008 
-.013 
-.034 
-.004 
.008* 
.010* 
.098* 
.003* 
.002* 
.009* 
.010* 
.009* 
-.116* 
.282* 
-.217* 
.127* 
.025* 
.128* 
-.004* 
.008* 
-.026* 
.004* 
-.084* 
-.002 
-.007* 
-.026* 
.002 
.014 
.014 
.105 
.004 
.003 
.010 
.011 
.010 
-.100 
.323 
-.205 
.140 
.037 
.134 
-.002 
.014 
-.018 
.005 
-.062 
.005 
-.002 
-.016 
.009 
.069 
.040 
.102 
.006 
.018 
.013 
.012 
.010 
.175 
.092 
.070 
.046 
.060 
.049 
.029 
.021 
.047 
.019 
.036 
.019 
.026 
.067 
.023 
*The 95% posterior interval excludes 0. 
Notes: To preserve space, we do not report store-specific moderators (intercepts) of the random household effects. 
effects of the pre-Christmas week (Week 51: .127), the 
Christmas week (Week 52: .025), and the Easter week 
(.128) on In spending are positive, whereas the effect of the 
year's first week on spending is negative (Week 1: -.217), 
possibly because of consumers' use of excessive stocks 
from the preceding holiday week or their economizing or 
dieting. During promotion-intensive weeks, the reduced 
prices enable consumers to spend less (Promweek: -.07), 
and their store spending decisions are more sensitive to 
weekly prices (Promweek x InPrice: -.026); these effects 
make intuitive sense. 
Again, the price war variables reveal some notable 
results (see also Figure 2). Consistent with H2, the price 
war causes decreases in In spending in the long run 
(PWRound: -.004). However, the coefficient of Pulse_ 
PWRound indicates that after the start of the price war, con 
sumers initially spend more per shopping trip (.008). This 
short-term phenomenon is consistent with a temporary 
income or windfall effect; that is, consumers initially per 
ceive the announced price reductions as a gain that triggers 
them to buy more, but then they adjust spending downward 
again. Consistent with H3b, we find that the price war 
makes spending more sensitive to weekly prices both in the 
short run (Pulse_PwRound x InPrice: -.084) and in the long 
run (PWRound x InPrice: -.026). Similar to the store visit 
results, for H4b, we find support only in the long run 
(PWRound x Pricelmage: .004), implying that price image 
becomes a more important criterion for spending as the 
cumulative number of items reduced in price increases. 
Decomposing the Net Impact of Price War on Store Visits 
and Spending 
The price war affects the models for store visit and 
spending in multiple ways. First, the price war has an 
impact on independent variables that capture price aspects 
(e.g., weekly price, price image). Second, there is a direct 
effect of the price war on intercepts and response coeffi 
cients for the store visit and spending models. The intercept 
effect is captured by the cumulative price war variable, 
PWRound, whereas the moderating effect of response coef 
ficients is manifested in the terms PWRound x InPrice and 
PWRound x Pricelmage. Because we want to focus on 
long-term changes, we exclude the temporary change cap 
tured by the pulse variable Pulse_PWRound. 
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To decompose the effect of the price war on store visit 
and spending, we proceed as follows: Because we calculate 
a ceteris paribus effect, we vary only the price-related 
variables (price image, basket price, and the PWRound 
variables), keeping the other variables (e.g., distance to 
store, store surface, feature, display) constant. This avoids 
confounding these variables and the price war variables. 
Specifically, we consider the quarter before the price war 
started the pre-price war period (2003, Weeks 30-42). The 
vectors vhi0 (the expenditure equation) and xhi0 (the store 
visit equation) include the price and price image values in 
the pre-price war period for household h and store i. They 
also include other independent variables, such as distance 
to a store, which are kept at their means across the pre- and 
post-price war periods to isolate the price war effect. The 
corresponding response coefficients are (D^ (the expendi 
ture equation) and ?h0 (the store visit equation). For the 
post-price war period, we take the last quarter of the data 
(fourth quarter of 2005), and the variables and parameters 
are vhi and xhil (again, all non-price war variables are kept 
at their means across pre- and post-price war periods), co^, 
and ?hl.6 The price war-induced change in a household's 
expenditure at a store, AE(Rhi) = E(Rhil) 
- 
E(Rhi0), can be 
decomposed into five (a-c) components (see the Web 
Appendix, Part C, at http://www.marketingpower.com/ 
jmroct08): 
(6) AE(Rhi)= Pt(z*hi0=l)AE(y*hilAvhi,(oh0) 
(a) Expenditure change due to changed independent variables 
+ Pr(z*hi0 
= 
l)AE(y^lAoh,vhi,) 
(b) Expenditure change due to changed coefficients 
+ Pr(z*hi0 
= l)o(n2) 
(c) Expenditure approximation error 
+ APr(z*hi=l|Axhi,Ch0)E(y;?1) 
(d) Incidence change due to change independent variables 
+ 
Aft(z^=l|xh|1.ACh)E(y^1) 
. 
(e) Incidence change due to changed coefficients 
Because parts a and b capture expenditure changes multi 
plied by pre-price war store visit probabilities, these parts 
can be interpreted as changes in spending at the existing 
store visit propensity (which we interpret as "the existing 
customer base"). Conversely, because parts d and e capture 
store visit changes multiplied by post-price war spending, 
they represent the effect of the changed store visit propen 
sity at the new expenditure level. Part c is an approximation 
term that is due to a Taylor series expansion (for details, see 
the Web Appendix, Part C, at http://www.marketing 
power.com/jmroct08). We find this term to be negligible in 
all the subsequent calculations. 
We calculate decomposition (Equation 6) at the house 
hold level (using the households-specific parameters) and 
then take the average across households.7 Table 5 shows the 
results for each of the six chains. For Albert Heijn, average 
spending decreases by 1.09, which is a reduction of 
10.3%. However, because the six chains together also lose 
10.3%, Albert Heijn's market share is preserved (consistent 
with Table 2 and Figure 3). Albert Heijn's spending loss is 
primarily due to a strong decrease in current customers' 
conditional spending (-.72), which is largely due to the 
effect of the price war rounds on the intercept (-.61). On 
the positive side, Albert Heijn, as the price war pioneer, 
enjoys an improvement in overall price image (see Figure 
5), which somewhat enhances conditional spending (+.01). 
However, consumers' increased sensitivity to store price 
image, combined with the notion that Albert Heijn's rela 
tive price image in the market remains unfavorable, more 
than offsets this effect (-.16).8 Albert Heijn also experi 
ences a net decrease in store patronage (-.38), caused pri 
marily by an intercept driven down by the price war rounds 
(-.41). 
Ironically, the two hard discounters, Aldi and Lidl, 
remain largely unaffected. Although the price war some 
what reduces the intercept part of store visit probability 
(-.23 and -.14 for Aldi and Lidl, respectively), consumers' 
increased sensitivity to their still-favorable price image 
(Figure 5) enhances store visits (+.25 and +.11, respec 
tively). The other three chains (C1000, Edah, and Super de 
Boer) all experience net losses in average spending (-.85, 
-.32, and -.56, respectively). Table 5 shows that the 
increased sensitivity of spending and store visits to ClOOO's 
favorable price image (+.10 and +.09, respectively) is not 
enough to compensate for major intercept losses (-.51 for 
both store visits and spending). Edah faces an array of 
problems: Both spending (-.16) and visits (-.16) are down, 
in each case driven by price war-induced intercept losses 
and an increased sensitivity to an unfavorable price image. 
Finally, Super de Boer's loss in spending is driven by inter 
cept reductions and reduced spending of the existing cus 
tomer base due the chain's increased vulnerability to its 
weak price image (-.11). 
The Impact of the Price War on Profitability and Share 
Values 
Our core analysis pertains to changes in purchase behav 
ior due to the price war. It might be argued that purchase 
behavior and the associated revenue implications are medi 
ators for ultimate performance measures, such as profitabil 
ity and stock market performance. Although detailed and 
reliable figures on national chain-specific margins are lack 
ing (in particular, for Aldi and Lidl), the retailers' annual 
reports unveil some important insights. Ahold (2004, p. 
64)?the holding company of Albert Heijn?indicates that 
"Albert Heijn's ongoing price repositioning strategy 
resulted in fierce price competition in the Dutch food retail 
market. This made it more difficult to maintain gross profit 
margins, and this pressure on gross profit margins is 
6We also tested a few alternative post-price war periods and found that 
the substantive outcomes remain the same. 
7In these calculations, we use all parameters regardless of whether their 
posterior intervals exclude zero. 
8As price image enters the interaction term after mean centering, it 
reflects the chain's price position compared with the market average. Thus, 
it takes on negative values for stores with a worse-than-average price 
image. As a result, an increased price image coefficient leads to negative 
store visit and spending effects for such stores. 
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expected to continue in 2005. Albert Heijn was able to 
compensate for part of the impact of lower prices by reduc 
ing the cost of goods, largely as a result of negotiations 
with vendors as well as increased vendor allowances. The 
cost reduction program at Albert Heijn is focused on lower 
ing logistic and distribution expenses." Albert Heijn's domi 
nant retail market position enabled it to recoup much of the 
price drop at the expense of manufacturers, whose profit 
margins, according to some industry sources, have 
decreased by 80% after three years of the Dutch price war 
fare (Baltesen 2006a). Together with a massive effort to 
improve the efficiency of its operations, this appears to have 
prevented huge downturns in Albert Heijn's profitability. 
In contrast, for Laurus (which owns the chains Edah and 
Super de Boer), net sales (revenues times gross margin) 
decline sharply in three successive years (Laurus 2003, 
2004, 2005) to -26% in 2002-2003, -14% in 2003-2004, 
and -10% in 2004-2005, leading to the following state 
ment: "As a result of the price war,... hundreds of products 
are sold below cost. Combined with a lower sales volume, 
this has had a significant negative impact on our bottom 
line. Given the financial position of Laurus, there was no 
other option but to sell Edah" (Laurus 2005, p. 3). Lacking 
the deep pockets and market power of Albert Heijn/Ahold, 
the Edah chain is a primary casualty of the price war. For 
C1000, net sales initially keep increasing (+8.1% in 2002 
2003; +3.2% in 2003-2004), but they begin to tumble as 
the price war lingers on (-1.6 % in 2004-2005) (Schuitema 
2003-2005). 
We observe similar patterns in the share values (see the 
Web Appendix, Part B, at http://www.marketingpower.com/ 
jmroct08). Structural break analyses of the retail compa 
nies' weekly stock price indexes (own stock price divided 
by the total market price) on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange reveal that the price war, though not significantly 
altering the share notation of Schuitema (C1000), goes 
along with a downward slope shift for Laurus (Edah, Super 
de Boer, Konmar) but an upward slope shift for Ahold that 
almost nullifies the pre-price war downward trend. It 
appears that the improved price image of Albert Heijn, 
together with its no-longer-declining market share and pur 
suit of massive efficiency improvement operations, has out 
weighed the harmful store visit and spending implications 
of the price war, thus restoring shareholders' faith. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary 
This article examines the impact of a major price war on 
consumer purchase behavior. We find that the price war that 
has been raging among Dutch grocery retailers since Octo 
ber 2003 has affected both store visit probabilities and 
spending. On the basis of a national household panel that 
provides hand-scan data and perceptual measures of store 
image across a nearly four-year period, we estimate a mul 
tivariate Tobit II model for store visits and spending. The 
model allows for household heterogeneity and a full covari 
ance structure (across store visits and spending) for the 
errors, for the random store intercepts, and for response 
coefficients. Decomposing the price war-induced changes 
in spending patterns, we show that these changes are 
induced not only by a shift in weekly prices and price 
image (independent variables in our model) but also by 
changes in household shopping behavior (model coeffi 
cients). As hypothesized, we find that the price war has 
induced consumers to shop around more, entailing a tempo 
rary increase in store visits across the board. Moreover, 
although the price war initially created a windfall effect that 
triggered temporarily increased spending, spending levels 
have shrunk in the long run as consumers have redistributed 
their purchases across the stores they visit. At the same 
time, the price war has enhanced consumers' sensitivity to 
both weekly store prices and chain price image, confirming 
predictions in the literature (Heil and Helsen 2001) and lab 
experiment findings (Wathieu, Muthukrshnan, and Bron 
nenberg 2004). Thus, consistent with the Lucas critique, we 
find that the initiator's major policy change affects response 
parameters (Van Heerde, Dekimpe, and Putsis 2005). 
Importantly, we distill these price war-based effects while 
controlling for price promotion-intensive weeks. Our 
decomposition of the spending change reveals differential 
consequences for key retail chains depending on (1) their 
overall (perceived) price position and (2) their ability to 
improve price image through the price war. 
Price War, What Is It Good For? 
Our answer to the question "What is a price war good 
for?" has five aspects. First, the Dutch supermarket price 
war has been good for the price image of its initiator; that 
is, Albert Heijn succeeded in improving its price image 
without doing significant harm to its quality and service 
images.9 However, other retailers, which followed Albert 
Heijn's move within days, did not obtain such price image 
gains. This first-mover advantage in a price war (Busse 
2002; Elzinga and Mills 1999; Rao, Bergen, and Davis 
2000) confirms several business anecdotes (Pauwels et al. 
2004; Simon 1997). If the price war initiator specifically 
wants to improve its price image, the price war appears to 
be successful. 
Second, the price war has been good for the initiator's 
market share; specifically, the slide in its market share came 
to a screeching halt (Figure 3). However, our analysis 
shows that this holds because the price war decreased 
spending at Albert Heijn at the same rate as at the market 
average (-10.3%). In that sense, Albert Heijn's "price war 
victory," as reported in the business press (Baltesen 2006a), 
is somewhat bittersweet. Still, investors have rewarded the 
price war initiator by neutralizing the downward trend in its 
stock price, consistent with the halt in its market share 
decline and its improved price image among consumers. 
Third, with regard to competitors, the price war has been 
bad for the high-service follower (Super de Boer) and the 
middle-service followers (C1000 and Edah) because they 
were also affected by smaller spending. Moreover, they 
have not enjoyed an improved price image, as the pioneer 
has. Their lower prices appear simply to subsidize existing 
customers. Ironically, however, the price war has been good 
for the hard discounters. Although consumer spending has 
9We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no change in these components 
after the start of the price war. 
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hardly been affected, these discounters' market shares have 
increased because their competitors' revenues have con 
tracted. The hard discounters have benefited from an 
increase in store visit propensity triggered by consumers' 
enhanced sensitivity to price image. 
Fourth, from a broader perspective, the upside of the 
price war for consumers is lower prices. Downsides are less 
obvious, but the lower manufacturer and retailer margins 
harm the industry as a whole. One likely consequence is a 
reduction in resources for research and development, 
which, in the long run, harms product quality and thus 
could hurt consumers. Another downside is that the price 
war may reduce the focus on important marketing variables, 
such as service and assortment. 
Fifth, firms may go bankrupt, which reduces consumer 
choice. For example, the Dutch price war forced the Edah 
supermarket chain to go out of business. 
External Validity 
Although our findings are based on a unique data set and 
a new methodology, they are consistent with trends reported 
by external sources. The increased consumer sensitivity to 
weekly prices is reflected in the nationwide Consumer 
Trends survey by EFMI (2002, 2004, 2005), which reports 
that low prices became the major consumer decision crite 
rion in store choice (46% of respondents named it within 
their top three criteria, up from 35%). This high sensitivity 
to price/promotions appears to be maintained in 2005. 
Because our findings are related to the weekly household 
level for a representative sample, they must be projected to 
aggregate levels (whole population for a full year) to grasp 
their relevance to the retailer's overall performance. For 
example, the total per-household spending change of 
-1.09 for Albert Heijn (Table 5) translates into an annual 
369 million revenue loss across the 6.5 million Dutch 
households (www.cbs.nl [accessed November 7, 2007]). 
Thus, the magnitude of the price war effects is manageri 
ally substantial compared with the 5.6 billion in revenue 
of Albert Heijn in 2003 (Ahold 2003, p. 61). Our estimated 
total loss among the six largest Dutch retailers amounts to 
972 million, which is close to industry estimates that put 
the loss at 900 million (Van Aalst et al. 2005). 
Managerial Implications 
Although our findings are related to the specific conse 
quences of this particular price war, we can speculate on 
recommendations for retail and brand managers who either 
intend to start a price war or perhaps are unintentionally 
involved in one. First, if the competitive situation is such 
that a price war is likely anyway (e.g., based on the early 
warning signals that Heil and Helsen [2001] identify), it is 
desirable to make the first strike because it may bring a 
first-mover advantage in price image improvement. This 
price war benefit is especially relevant for market players 
with a price image problem, as was the case for the Dutch 
price war initiator. 
Second, we caution high-end market players about the 
risk of using price as a competitive weapon because it may 
increase price (image) sensitivity. This could backfire if the 
high-end player's price remains relatively high as a result of 
competitive reactions. 
Third, discounters may actually benefit from a price war. 
They can advertise their low price levels, for which there 
may be increased consumer attention and sensitivity, lead 
ing to more store visits and expenditures. If there remains a 
substantial price gap with the middle- and high-end players 
(as was the case for Aldi and Lidl in the Dutch price war; 
see Table 2), low-end players seem to have little reason to 
reduce prices further during a price war. 
Fourth, managers should not be too encouraged if a price 
war initially brings more visitors to their stores or buyers to 
their brands. A price move may reengage customers (Chen 
and McMillan 1992) to compare prices in the short run, but 
in the long run, they are expected to return to their usual 
shopping frequencies. In this study, we find that stores with 
an unfavorable price image tend to lose store visitors in the 
long run. 
Fifth, to prevent a price war escalation, it may be a good 
idea first to analyze consumer responses when one market 
player begins to cut prices. If purchase behavior changes 
only modestly or temporarily, it may be better to focus on 
marketing-mix instruments other than price to win back 
customers. If the changes are strong, there is little resort 
other than to respond by offering price reductions as well, 
possibly spiraling down to a price war. 
Sixth, channel power is a major asset when a retailer is 
involved in a price war. In the Dutch price war, Albert Heijn 
initiated the price war when it still had market leadership 
and was widely regarded as offering superior service and 
quality. As such, this situation is consistent with the power 
transition paradigm (Organski 1968); that is, the market 
leader launches a preemptive strike while it is still powerful 
(i.e., before most shoppers have lost interest). Because the 
chain had and has the highest market share, it represents a 
major outlet for many manufacturers, which they cannot 
afford to lose. As result, Albert Heijn could divert a major 
part of its loss in margin (due to reduced consumer prices) 
to its suppliers. Edah, a price war casualty, probably suf 
fered from both low channel power and a lack of cost lead 
ership (Rao, Bergen, and Davis 2000). 
Seventh, it seems particularly unwise to provoke com 
petitors with a competitor-focused goal, such as becoming 
less expensive than the market average, as Albert Heijn did 
at the start of the price war. Instead, it seems better to focus 
on the savings for consumers. 
Finally, retailers should consider the market characteris 
tics that may moderate the consequences of the supermar 
ket price war we found in this study. The negative market 
level consequences of the price war may be related to the 
grocery category, whose primary demand appeared to be 
price inelastic. Overall spending in the category may 
increase when the price war brings the product within reach 
of large new consumer segments (e.g., when air travel, then 
computers, and finally printers became inexpensive enough 
for most Westerners). 
Policy Implications 
The scope of price war consequences differentiates them 
from periods of intense price promotions (Heil and Helsen 
2001). The Dutch supermarket price war has incited a 
nationwide discussion on setting minimum prices and 
competitive regulations, right up to the Dutch parliament 
(Baarsma and De Nooij 2005). Such a public debate is 
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rather new to antitrust legislation, which has traditionally 
focused on a lack of competition and tends to ignore "too 
much competition" (e.g., in the form of price wars). For 
example, in defense of a laissez-faire approach, Baarsma 
and De Nooij (2005) argue that law enforcers cannot invoke 
Article 2 of the European Treaty, which prohibits the use of 
unreasonably low prices to drive out competition, because 
there is no evidence of intent to achieve this (though in real 
ity, the Dutch supermarket price war drove out one chain, 
Edah). Such arguments reflect a strong belief in the eco 
nomic rationality and foresight of managers, which may not 
be supported by the growing literature on managerial biases 
in pricing (e.g., Nijs, Srinivasan, and Pauwels 2007), 
competitive overreaction (Leeflang and Wittink 1996), and 
escalation of commitment (Ghemawat 1991). However, in 
the Dutch situation, there was no political majority to 
implement legislation to prevent price wars. 
Limitations and Further Research 
This study has several limitations, providing leads for 
further research. Our data come from one price war in one 
country; further studies are needed to establish whether our 
findings generalize to other price war situations. For exam 
ple, how will consumer spending respond in a more price 
elastic market? We model cross-chain effects with the cor 
related intercepts and error terms in the multivariate store 
visit and spending models. Although further research could 
analyze how each competitor's marketing-mix instrument 
price has a different impact, incorporating explicit cross 
instrument effects would greatly complicate the already 
strenuous model estimation. In the computation of weekly 
prices, the household-specific basket weights are the same 
across stores. However, a household may buy a specific 
subset of the basket in one store and another subset in 
another store. Thus, there might be a temptation to use 
store-specific weights. The reason we chose not to follow 
this route is that it would lead to an endogeneity problem; 
the dependent variable (choice) is used to construct the 
independent variable. In relation to this point, another 
avenue for further research would be a detailed investiga 
tion of differences across households in terms of changes in 
basket content. Furthermore, we specify interactions for the 
moderating effects of the price war on price (image) sensi 
tivity. An extension to stochastic time-varying parameters 
(e.g., Van Heerde, Mela, and Manchanda 2004) would be a 
worthwhile endeavor (though it would also severely stretch 
model estimation). Finally, we model prices as exogenous 
in relation to household decisions on store visits and spend 
ing because it seems much more likely that chains base 
their prices on competition than on unobserved individual 
level demand shocks (for a similar argument, see Erdem, 
Imai, and Keane 2003). Incorporating endogenous prices 
and complicated feedback loops would allow for a quantita 
tive analysis of the antecedents and momentum of a price 
war. Despite these limitations, our analysis of the Dutch 
supermarket price war generates valuable insights into an 
important and timely marketing phenomenon and points to 
exciting possibilities for further research. 
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